Thirty Years of Currency Crises in Argentina: External Shocks or Domestic Fragility? by Graciela Kaminsky et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THIRTY YEARS OF CURRENCY CRISES IN ARGENTINA:










This paper was written for the Economía 18th Panel Meeting- LACEA, IMPA - Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
November 21, 2008.  We thank Gastón Gelos, Roberto Rigobon, Federico Sturzenegger, Carlos Winograd,
and participants at the Economia Meeting for helpful comments.  The views expressed herein are those
of the authors and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, its management, or the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Graciela Kaminsky, Amine Mati, and Nada Choueiri. All rights reserved. Short sections
of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full
credit, including © notice, is given to the source.Thirty Years of Currency Crises in Argentina: External Shocks or Domestic Fragility?
Graciela Kaminsky, Amine Mati, and Nada Choueiri




This paper examines Argentina’s currency crises from 1970 to 2001, with  particular attention to the
role of domestic and external factors. Using VAR estimations, we find that deteriorating domestic
fundamentals matter.  For example, at the core of the late 1980s crises was excessively loose monetary
policy while a sharp output contration triggered the collapse of the currency board in January 2002.
 In contrast, adverse external shocks were at the heart of the 1995 crisis, with spillovers from the Mexican



















Argentina has had an active presence in international capital markets since its 
independence in the early 19
th century.  Participation has been quite volatile though.  In the early 
1800s, in the midst of the lending boom fueled by the end of the Napoleonic wars, Argentina as 
well as many countries in Latin America were able to issue bonds in London to finance their 
wars of independence and the civil wars that followed.  This lending boom ended in the summer 
of 1825 when the Bank of England raised the discount rate to stop the drain in reserves.   The 
tightening of liquidity was followed by stock market crashes, banking problems, and recessions 
in England and Continental Europe.  Within months, the crisis also spread to Latin America.    
Argentina defaulted in 1827 in the midst of what is known as the first Latin American Debt 
Crisis, only resuming  payments in 1857.   
Similar international capital flow booms to emerging markets occurred in 1867-1872, 
1880-1890, 1893-1913, and 1920-1929 fueled by an easing monetary stance in the financial 
centers of those times and by the financial needs of railway expansion, urbanization, and 
development of the banking sector of countries in the periphery.  While Argentina participated 
heavily in all these capital flow bonanzas, its participation was quite volatile with financial crises 
often following booms.
1   
In the aftermath of the crisis of the 1930s, international capital markets all but 
disappeared and Argentina was unable to borrow again until the 1970s.  The period from the 
mid-1970s to 2002 was as tumultuous as that of the earlier era and characterized by booms and 
busts in international capital flows, crises, and failed stabilization programs.  During this period, 
Argentina had eight currency crises, four banking crises, and two sovereign defaults.   Many 
argued that domestic fragilities were at the heart of these crises.
2  Others blamed erratic 
international capital markets by pointing out the lending boom of the late 1970s that ended with 
defaults across all Latin American countries or the lending cycle of the 1990s that triggered 
banking and currency crises in the most active participants in international capital markets, such 
                                                 
1 For example, the boom of the 1880s ended with banking and currency crises as well as a sovereign default, while 
the end of the capital inflow episode of the 1920s led to Argentina’s abandonment of the gold standard.  See, 
Kaminsky (2009) for an analysis of Latin America’s participation in international capital markets from 
independence to the Great Depression. 
2 See, for example,  Mussa (2002) and Perry and Serven (2002) 2 
 
as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
3  This important debate is still 
unsettled.  Now, in the midst of the worst international financial crisis since the great depression, 
untangling the roots of financial distress becomes crucial.  This is the question we plan to 
examine in this paper.   
We focus on Argentina’s currency crises of the last thirty years.  We cast our net wide 
and examine the role of three external shocks and four sources of domestic vulnerability on 
currency turmoil.  Our selection of external shocks centers on the role of the easing/tightening of 
monetary policy in the world financial centers, financial contagion and overall “international 
investors’ sentiment” about emerging markets, and real exchange rate misalignments caused by 
currency depreciations in Argentina's major trading partners.   With respect to domestic 
vulnerabilities, we focus on the boom-bust cycle of domestic credit and monetary policy, fiscal 
problems, shocks to economic activity, and increases in households’ risk aversion triggered by 
spells of hyperinflation, controls on foreign exchange transactions, cycles of controls on prices 
and wages, and bank deposit confiscations that have plagued Argentina’s recent history.  To 
capture the onset of the crises and track the buildup of fragility during fixed exchange rate 
regimes, we look at the evolution of foreign exchange reserves of the central bank as a 
proportion of domestic credit.  For short periods of time in the early 1970s and late 1980s, 
Argentina adopted a dual exchange rate regime, with a fixed exchange rate for commercial 
transactions and a freely floating exchange rate for capital account transactions.  For these 
episodes, the onset of a crisis is captured by an index of exchange market pressure, which is 
constructed as a composite index of losses of reserves of the central bank and the dual exchange 
market premium.  Structural VAR techniques are used to identify the effects of domestic and 
external shocks on the onset of the crises.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a chronology of   
Argentina’s currency crises since 1970.  Section III presents a basic model to underpin the VAR 
specification. Section IV discusses the estimation, presents the data, and examines key empirical 
results. Section V concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 For example, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart  (1992, 1996). 3 
 
II. Chronology of the Currency Crises
4 
During most of the post WWII period, Argentina experienced chronic inflation. Many 
stabilization programs with the exchange rate as an anchor were launched in the belief that with 
fixed exchange rates, domestic inflation would converge quickly to world levels. These programs 
also included plans of fiscal and monetary austerity (although, in most cases, they were later 
abandoned).  All the programs ended up with currency crises. In addition to failed stabilization 
attempts, global external factors also contributed to the general instability of the domestic 
currency. Declining interest rates in the industrialized world fueled capital flows to developing 
countries in the late 1970s and in the 1990s and while these capital flow bonanzas are generally 
considered beneficial to emerging markets, they also trigger real exchange rate appreciations and 
current account deficits, which often lead to currency crises.   Besides, these flows are prone to 
quick reversals whenever monetary policy in the center economies switches to a contractionary 
stance. Also, fragilities in the domestic financial system as well as forced conversions of deposits 
were another potential cause of runs against the Argentine peso.  Thus, our chronology of crises 
will highlight the evolution of the different stabilization programs implemented in this period as 
well as the role of world shocks and financial vulnerabilities. 
To help in our crisis chronology, Figure 1 shows the evolution of the central bank’s 
foreign exchange reserves and the dual market premium from January 1970 to January 2002, the 
month of the onset of the last crisis.  The dates of the currency crises are indicated by the vertical 
lines.   It is clear from Figure 1 that almost all crises were preceded by losses of reserves or by 
sharp increases in the dual market premium when foreign exchange controls were introduced.   
Table 1 reports crisis dates and the names of the stabilization programs preceding them as 
well as the time in which these programs were implemented.  To gauge the severity of each 
crisis, Table 1 shows the loss of foreign exchange reserves of the central bank in the months 
leading into the crisis, the dual exchange market premium at the onset of the crisis, and the 
devaluations following the crisis.   All speculative attacks, with the exception of the one in 1995, 
                                                 
4 This chronology is partly based on Blejer and Liviatan (1987), Cumby and van Wijnbergen (1989), D’Amato, 
Grubisic, and Powell (1997), De la Torre, Levy-Yeyati, and Schmukler (2002), Di Tella and Dornbusch (1989), 
Dornbusch and de Pablo (1989), Edwards (2002a and 2002b), Giorgio and Sagari (1996), Hausman and Velasco 
(2002), IMF (2004a and 2004b), Kiguel (1989), Montanaro (1990), and Rodriguez (1994). 
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ended with a sharp devaluation.  The central bank managed to avoid a devaluation during the 
speculative attack of 1995, despite a 41-percent loss in foreign exchange reserves.    
The first crisis and the collapse of the stabilization plan implemented by the then minister 
of finance José Gelbard occurred in March 1975 after various speculative attacks that resulted in 
a 56 percent loss of foreign exchange reserves even in the presence of many restrictions to free 
convertibility.
5  At that time, the domestic currency in the commercial and the financial markets 
were devalued by 100 and 50 percent, respectively.  More than a dozen additional devaluations 
followed over the course of the year.
6   
The second crisis occurred in February 1981 when a 10 percent devaluation was 
announced.  Two other devaluations followed: 34 percent in April and 38 percent in June.  This 
was also the collapse of the second stabilization program, the Tablita Plan, which was launched 
in December 1978 and characterized by a slowly declining preannounced rate of exchange rate 
depreciation (the “tablita”).  The program also included fiscal and monetary reforms as well as a 
sweeping financial liberalization plan that led to the complete deregulation of domestic banking 
activities and a removal of capital account restrictions.  This episode coincided with the capital 
flow bonanza fueled by the savings of OPEC economies following the 1973 oil shock and 
channeled to emerging markets through the eurodollar market.   By 1980, the boom in capital 
inflows to Argentina had triggered an explosive growth in domestic credit and overall banking 
fragilities, which ended with the failure of two of the largest private banks as well as the 
liquidation of almost 100 financial institutions.
7  The crisis in 1981 also coincided with the 
reversal in international capital flows triggered by a shift towards anti-inflationary monetary 
policy in the United States.    
The third crisis took place in July 1982.  Following the February 1981 crisis, a variety of 
refinancing programs to banks and insurance programs to holders of foreign currency 
denominated debt were implemented, maximum interest rates were reimposed and then 
                                                 
5 Part of the exchange rate pressures led to a sharp increase in the financial market premium, which peaked at 369 
percent right before the abandonment of the program.    
6 While during 1975 there were several devaluations, such as the devaluation experienced in June 1975 when 
Celestino Rodrigo was the Finance Minister, these devaluations are not examined separately.  Consecutive 
devaluations less than six months apart from the first devaluation are considered part of the same crisis.   
7 See Baliño (1987) for a detailed analysis of the banking crisis in 1980-1981. 5 
 
abandoned,
8 and dual rates were reintroduced from March to December 1981. Naturally, the 
continuous regulatory changes regarding interest rates and foreign exchange markets contributed 
to reducing investors’ jittery confidence in the domestic currency and the banking sector.  During 
this period, inflation continued to accelerate in part fueled by the bailout of the banking sector.  
Despite the announcement of a new stabilization plan in December 1981, the so-called Alemann 
Plan,  inflation continued to surge fueled this time by central-bank financing of massive military 
spending during the Malvinas war. The economy was also hard hit by many adverse external 
shocks: the decrease in international commodity prices, the increase in foreign interest rates, a 
world-wide recession, and the beginning of the world debt crisis.  After a 17-percent loss in 
foreign exchange reserves, the crisis culminated in July 1982 with a 148 percent devaluation, the 
introduction of dual exchange rates with controls on domestic interest rates and the capital 
account, and an exchange rate floating for the following three years.    
During the floating regime, inflation continued to increase, reaching 300 percent during 
the first half of 1985.  In June 1985, a new stabilization plan, the Austral Plan, was launched.  A 
new currency, the Austral,
9  was introduced, the dual exchange rate regime was abandoned, the 
domestic currency was fixed again to the dollar, and interest rate controls were eliminated.   
Importantly, the introduction of the Austral was accompanied by a forced renegotiation and mark 
down of debt contracts and banking deposits.  However, while inflation was contained, the 
annual rate of inflation was still at about 100 percent by mid-1986, forcing the government to 
abandon the peg. The government tried to save the program with repeated rounds of enforcement 
and then relaxation of price controls and other restrictions with no success. In the first nine 
months of 1987, reserves of the central bank declined by 1.5 billion dollars (60 percent), leading 
to a collapse of the Austral Plan in 1987, with the domestic currency being devalued by 16 
percent in September and by 33 percent in October. 
The next two currency crises occurred in the midst of a hyperinflation period.
10  The first 
crisis occurred in April 1989, with a 387 percent devaluation.  The second crisis erupted within 
eight months, with a 175 percent devaluation in December 1989 and a 220 percent devaluation in 
                                                 
8 See Baliño (1987) and Machinea and Fanelli (1987) for a detailed analysis of the measures adopted during this 
period. 
9 One Austral was equivalent to 1,000 pesos. 
10 From the collapse of the Austral Plan in September 1987 to the implementation of the Convertibilty Plan in 1991, 
prices in Argentina increased 4,500 times. 6 
 
February 1990.  Again during this period, there were two stabilization attempts: The Primavera 
Plan in August 1988 and the BB Plan in December 1989.  Both plans included price controls, 
dual exchange rates, and fiscal and monetary contraction.  In both plans, monetary and fiscal 
restraints were rapidly abandoned and investors’ confidence immediately deteriorated.    In 
December 1989, the government froze most domestic austral-denominated time deposits and 
converted them to 10-year dollar denominated bonds, the Bonex.  The value of these bonds 
immediately dropped to less that 30 percent of face value, weakening investors’ faith in the 
domestic currency.   
The last two currency crises were in early 1995 and in January 2002.  In April 1991, the 
Convertibility Plan was launched. Its main feature was the creation of a currency board to 
enforce the 1-to-1 peg of the peso to the dollar.
11  The plan also included a series of privatization 
and deregulation measures as well as fiscal reforms.  Also in the early 1990s, Argentina, along 
with other emerging markets, witnessed another round of capital inflows triggered by declining 
interest rates in the United States together with the 1989-1990 Brady Plan agreement for Mexico 
and other Latin American countries.   As in the late 1970s, capital inflows led to a domestic 
credit explosion and to consumption, real estate, and stock market booms. The real exchange rate 
appreciated and the current account deteriorated.  In 1994, the shift back to a tight monetary 
policy in the United States
12 led to worldwide interest rate increases, contributing to banking 
fragilities and a credit crunch amid a severe recession in Argentina.  Following the Mexican 
crisis in December 1994, Argentina's banking system suffered from large deposit withdrawals.  
As investors converted pesos into dollars, the central bank's reserves decreased sharply (41 
percent in the first quarter of the year), marking the first currency crisis of the Convertibility 
Plan.  At that time, however, the convertibility program did not end up with a devaluation of the 
domestic currency and the reversal of capital flows to Argentina was only transitory.   
By the end of 1995, capital flows not only had resumed but even surpassed the levels 
reached before the Mexican crisis.  Capital flows to Argentina and Latin America continued to 
grow even in the midst of the 1997-1998 Asian crisis.  Eventually, these flows started to 
diminish as the  behavior of international capital markets changed drastically during the Russian 
crisis and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in the Fall of 1998.  This time around, 
                                                 
11 The monetary reform in January 1992 replaced the austral with the peso at a rate of 10,000 australs for 1 peso. 
12 The Federal Funds interest rate was raised by 250 basis points in 1994 alone. 7 
 
as in the mid 1980s, the collapse in capital flows was of a more permanent nature.  Argentina 
still fared comparably better than other countries in the region, with capital flows to Argentina 
still relatively high in the last half of 1999.  The relief was however only temporary as capital 
flows to Argentina completely dried out in the last half of 2000 and especially in 2001.  By this 
time, political uncertainty (President Menem’s desire to remain in power for a third term) as well 
as financial turmoil following Brazil’s crisis in January 1999 had severely affected private 
investment and consumption in Argentina, with economic activity plummeting through 2001.  As 
the situation continued to deteriorate, the government sought more financing.  When the 
government found it difficult to reschedule its debt, it resorted to compulsory placing of 
government bonds at banks, with banks becoming increasingly more exposed to government 
default.  By June 2001, a massive bank run had started, sealing the fate of the currency board.  In 
December, the government announced a deposit freeze, foreign exchange controls, and a debt 
moratorium.  The currency board was formally abandoned in January 2002 with a 40 percent 
devaluation of the peso. The convertibility regime was replaced with a dual exchange rate system 
based on an official exchange rate of 1.4 pesos per dollar for the public sector and most trade-
related transactions while all other transactions were conducted at market rates. On February 11, 
the dual exchange rate was abolished and the peso depreciated to 1.8 pesos per dollar.  By June 
2002, the exchange rate had reached 4 pesos per dollar. 
III. A Basic Model 
The numerous crises in Argentina in the last quarter of a century have stirred a heated 
debate about the causes behind the periodic collapses of the peg.  Throughout the years, several 
explanations have been offered.  Many argue, as it is also evident in our chronology, that at the 
heart of the crises are large fiscal deficits, leading to rapid growth in money creation and 
eventually to a depletion of reserves that make the peg unsustainable.  Another view stresses that 
crises erupt because of real exchange rate misalignments brought about by exchange-rate based 
stabilization plans
13 or by devaluations in neighboring countries.  According to this view, the 
exchange rate misalignment eventually leads to unsustainable current account deficits and to 
speculative attacks against the domestic currency.  Another version of the “real appreciation” 
theory of currency crises links the real appreciation with protracted recessions and with   
                                                 
13 See, for example, Reinhart and Végh (2002). 8 
 
governments’ inability to defend the peg in bad times.  For example, Drazen and Masson (1994) 
conclude that in the presence of persistent unemployment, a tough policy (such as one required 
by the commitment to the currency board in Argentina in the late 1990s) may lower rather than 
raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge and thus trigger a currency attack.   
The crises of the 1990s brought to the spotlight the fact that crises may be of a contagious 
nature.  While crises could be synchronous across countries because of a common adverse shock 
(i.e. a rise in world interest rates), crises may spillover when the infected country is linked to 
others via trade or finance.  For example, Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004) argue that the 
1994 Mexican crisis spread to Argentina and Brazil via mutual fund withdrawals as mutual fund 
managers scrambled for liquidity following investors’ major redemptions from mutual funds 
specializing in Latin America.  Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) conclude that the 
Mexican default in 1982 propagated to all Latin American countries when U.S. banks, badly 
damaged by the Mexican default, tried to rebalance the overall risk of their portfolios by calling 
loans and drying up credit lines not only in Mexico but also in all the Latin American countries 
where they had exposure.  Calvo (1999) provides a different interpretation of the collapse of the 
peg, which he labels “the sudden stop” syndrome.  While this view shares with previous views 
the acknowledgment of fiscal unsustainability and real exchange rate misalignment problems, it 
places strong emphasis on international financial shocks.  At the core of Calvo's explanation lies 
an unexpected and persistent stop in international capital flows, such as the one observed 
following the Russian crisis in August 1998.  As explained in Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi 
(2002), the unexpected slowdown in capital flows forces emerging economies, such as 
Argentina, to drastic adjustments of their current account deficits to accommodate the shortage 
of external credit.  Naturally, a real exchange rate adjustment becomes the essential ingredient 
for this adjustment to take place.  With sticky prices, this adjustment can only be accomplished 
with a devaluation.   
Finally, Kiguel and Neumeyer (1995) and Ericsson and Kamin (1993) among others, 
have emphasized investors’ jittery confidence in Argentina’s domestic currency and the banking 
sector due to the continuous changes in regulations on interest rates and foreign exchange 
markets as well as the forced conversions of bank deposits in 1985, 1989, and 2001 as triggers of 
runs against the peso.  This section will incorporate these features into a small open economy 
model, which will be estimated afterwards. 9 
 
As examined above, the monetary authority in Argentina alternated between the adoption 
of fixed and dual exchange rate systems. For example, a fixed exchange rate and full 
convertibility for both current and capital account transactions were at the core of the Tablita 
Plan and the Convertibility Plan while a dual exchange rate system was introduced during the 
Gelbard Plan (1973-1975).  In most cases, when the peg collapsed, the central bank allowed the 
exchange rate to float for some time.  Our model should reflect these changing exchange rate 
regimes.  This section discusses two versions of the model that respectively capture the stylized 
features of each system.  
The Fixed Exchange Rate Regime 
The model is a discrete-time model of an open economy with a fixed and unique 
exchange rate. The government has a predefined goal for domestic credit, not necessarily 
consistent with the goal of a fixed exchange rate. Fixing the exchange rate is a secondary goal 
that can be abandoned if it hinders discretionary monetary policy. This assumption seems to 
capture quite well monetary and exchange rate policies in Argentina in the post WWII period. 
Investors realize that these two goals might conflict and expect the central bank to abandon the 
peg when it runs out of reserves as in Krugman (1979). We follow Blanco and Garber (1986) to 
model the onset of the crisis with a twist.  In that paper, the authors only focus on the effect of 
money supply shocks.  Here, we extend their model to account for foreign shocks as well as 
other domestic shocks, such as fiscal policy.   
The money market is the central component of our model.  Equilibrium in that market is 
given by the following equation, 
                                ,       =
d
t t t t t t y c i p m μ γ β α + + + − −                                                   (1)  
where m  and p  are respectively the logarithms of the money stock and the price level, i is the 
domestic interest rate, y is the aggregate output level, and 
d μ  represents money demand shocks. 
A negative money demand shock can capture investors’ shift out of pesos into dollars in the 
midst of the financial instability of the 1980s or the run against deposits due to confiscation risk  
in 2001.  A new feature of the money demand is the component c.  As we will examine in more 
detail below, this component will try to capture shifts in international investors’ perception about 
emerging markets.  For example, an increase in c could capture international investors' renewed 
interest in emerging markets following the resolution of the debt crisis, with a decline in c 10 
 
typifying the sudden stop syndrome such as the one triggered by the Russian crisis of August 
1998 or a contagion effect, such as the reversal in capital flows following the 1994 Mexican 
crisis. 
In the open economy, interest rates and prices are determined by  
                                                    t t t t t t e e E i i ρ + − + +
∗
1 =                                             (2)   
                                                   , = t t t q e p −                                                                (3)   
where i* is the world interest rate, e is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate, ρ  is the risk 
premium, q is the log of the real exchange rate, and E  is an expectations operator.   Equation (2) 
allows for deviations from interest parity. Equation (3) allows for deviations from purchasing 
parity.  In equation (3), the log of the foreign price level is normalized to zero.   Money supply in 
the fixed exchange rate system can be written as follows:  
                                                        , = t t t r d m +                                                                (4)  
where r  is the ratio of foreign exchange reserves of the central bank to domestic credit in foreign 
currency and d is the logarithm of the domestic credit component of the money base.  In this 
simple model, changes in domestic monetary policy or changes in bank credit to the private 
sector, changes in the world interest rate, shocks to money demand and sudden stop or contagion 
effects will determine the evolution of reserves of the central bank. When reserves are depleted, 
the central bank will not be able to intervene in the foreign exchange market any longer and will 
have to let the exchange rate float. Using the money-market clearing conditions, we can 
determine the equilibrium flexible exchange rate  . ~
t e
14 
                       . ~   ~ ) (1 =     ) ( 1 t +
∗ − + + − − + + t t t t t t t t e E e q y c i d α α γ β ρ α                             (5)   
To obtain the time path of the permanently floating exchange rate  , ~ e  we need to specify 
the stochastic processes that govern domestic credit, risk premium, foreign interest rates, the real 
exchange rate, output, and the “sentiment” of international investors towards emerging markets.  
                                          
s
t t t t d g d μ φ + + −1   =                                                          (6)       
                                          
g
t t μ ρ ρ + =                                                                       (7) 
                                           
∗ ∗
−
∗ + t t t i i μ 1 =                                                                      (8) 
                                                 
14 In a pure flexible exchange rate regime, by assumption, the stock of reserves of the central bank drops to zero. 
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−   = 1                                                           (9) 
                                          
g
t t t u g g + −1 =                                                                   (10) 




t t t q q μ χμ δ + − −1   =                                                       (11)                         
y
t t t q y y μ λ + + =                                                             (12) 
 where  g  is the fiscal deficit,  y  is the full employment level of output, and  ,
s μ  ,
g μ  ,
∗ μ  ,
c μ  
y μ  are shocks to money supply, to fiscal policy, to world interest rates, foreign investors’ 
sentiment towards emerging market assets (either exuberance or sudden stop/contagion 
syndrome), and the shock to aggregate demand.  Finally, 
q μ  captures exogenous shocks to the 
real exchange rate.  For example, it may reflect nominal devaluations in trading-partner 
countries, such as the Brazilian depreciation in January 1999.  The shocks 
j μ  are normally-
distributed white noise shocks with zero mean and standard deviation  j σ , for 
} , , , , , , { q c g s y d j ∗ ∈ .   
Equation (6) represents the domestic credit process.  In (6), we allow fiscal imbalances to 
be (partly or totally) financed by money creation.  Equation (7) captures a time-varying risk 
premium, with fiscal deficits triggering higher premium.
15  Equation (8) reflects the process 
followed by the world interest rate.  Equation (9) captures investors’ interest in emerging 
markets.  Naturally, this interest cannot just be explained by shocks to risk aversion triggered by 
say, the resolution of the debt crisis in 1989.  Fluctuations in interest rates in financial centers 
can also affect the reallocation of portfolios towards emerging economies.  This is why  increases 
in i* in equation (9) affect adversely the reallocation of portfolios towards emerging economies.  
In equation (10), we model fiscal policy as an exogenous process.  Equation (11) models the real 
exchange rate as a mean reverting process.  We allow the real exchange rate to be affected by 
monetary shocks since expansionary monetary policy in fixed exchange rate regimes will lead to 
higher inflation and a transitory real appreciation as examined in Reinhart and Végh (2002).  We 
also allow for other exogenous shocks to the real exchange rate.  With these shocks, we would 
                                                 
15 In models with sovereign debt, risk premium is always associated with the possibility of default.  It is argued that 
as debt increases, it may become unsustainable or the country may become unwilling to pay back.  These models 
suggest including foreign debt as an explanatory variable for risk.  Unfortunately, for empirical purposes, we cannot 
relate the risk premium to foreign debt because debt statistics are at best only available at annual frequencies and our 
estimations use monthly data.  Since in Argentina, governments deficits have been associated with foreign 
borrowing, we include the fiscal indicator, for which we have monthly data, as the determinant of the premium.   12 
 
like to capture the effects of a depreciation in a trading-partner country, such as the effect of the 
devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999.  Finally, output deviates temporarily from the 
full employment level with fluctuations of the real exchange rate or in response to other 
aggregate demand shocks.  The relationship between the real exchange rate and economic 
activity in equation (12) is ambiguous since a real depreciation can increase competitiveness and 
fuel demand for domestic goods, but also lead to contractionary effect because of liability 
dollarization (Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004)).   
Using equations (5)-(12), we obtain the equilibrium flexible exchange rate: 
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(13)  
The exchange rate depreciates in response to expansionary monetary shocks, fiscal 
deficits, and positive shocks to world interest rates; it appreciates in response to positive output 
shocks, increases in investors’ interest in emerging markets, and positive money demand 
disturbances.  Finally, a real exchange rate depreciation has an ambiguous effect on the 
equilibrium flexible nominal exchange rate.  The decline in domestic prices triggering the real 
depreciation leads to higher real money balances and lower domestic interest rates, which fuel a 
depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.  But the real depreciation may stimulate economic 
activity and demand for money, which results into an appreciation of the equilibrium exchange 
rate. 
The peg will collapse at time  1 + t  if  e et > ~
1 + . Thus, the time t probability of a currency 
collapse in the next period can be written as follows: 
                                            ], > [ Pr = ) ( 1 1 t t t k k F + − υ                                                       (14)   
where  
 













γ β αρ θ θ α φ
μ γμ θ βμ μ θ μ θ μ θ μ θ υ
+ + − − − + − −
+ − − + − + +
∗




1 1 4 1 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 1 1
) (1 =
) ( ) (1 =
 
and F'(0 > ) t k ,  , ) (1 = ); /(1 ) (1 = 2 1 βω βω α θ α α α φ θ + + + + +  
) (1 1
1











   
Knowing the distribution function of the shocks  ) ( t k F , agents can form  expectations of 
the future exchange rate based on the average of the current fixed exchange rate and the rate 13 
 
expected to materialize conditional on a devaluation, both weighed by the respective 
probabilities of occurrence:  
                             ) > | ~ ( )] ( [1 ) ( = 1 1 1 t t t t t t t t k e E k F e k F e E + + + − + υ                                   (15)   
After linearizing equation (15), we can solve the model in equations (1)-(4) and obtain 
the path of reserves in the fixed exchange-rate system when there is a chance that there will be an 
abandonment of the peg: 
                           . ) ( = 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
d
t t t t t t t t q g y c i e d r μ η η η η η η η + + − + + − − −
∗                 (16) 
The coefficients  i η  are function of the parameters of the distribution of the shocks and of 
the structural parameters of the model.  Reserves will fall with expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies, and with hikes to world interest rates.  In contrast, a positive shock to money demand or 
demand for domestic goods as well as investors’ shift towards emerging markets lead to an 
increase in foreign exchange reserves.  Shocks to the real exchange rate have an ambiguous 
effect on reserves.  The VAR to be estimated is based on equations (6)-(12) and (16). 
The Dual Exchange Rate Regime 
To relieve balance-of-payment pressures on foreign exchange reserves, albeit 
temporarily, Argentina implemented dual rates in the early 1970s and in the 1980s, with a fixed 
exchange rate for trade account transactions and a flexible exchange rate for all other 
transactions. We now proceed to develop a simple model of the economy under a dual-rate 
regime to examine the behavior of the central bank's foreign exchange reserves and the dual 
market premium. 
The core of our model is still the money market equilibrium condition given by equation 
(1).   Prices continue to be determined by equation (3). The interest parity condition is now 
written as follows:  
                                         t t t t t t f f E i i ρ + − + +
∗
1 =                                                            (2')   
where  t f  is the log of the exchange rate for non-trade account transactions. Note that in equation 
(2') it is assumed that the purchase and sale of assets as well as the interest rate proceeds are 
channeled through the non-trade account exchange rate market.  Using (1), (2'), and (3), we can 
write the equilibrium condition in the money market as 
            1 =     ) ( +
∗ − − + − − + + − + t t t
d
t t t t t t t t f E f q y c i e r d α α μ γ β ρ α                            (17) 14 
 
where e is the fixed exchange rate for trade account transactions.  Note that reserves at the 
central bank can still change in response to trade account imbalances because the central bank 
intervenes to keep the commercial rate fixed.  A persistent deficit in the trade account may 
deplete reserves holdings. When reserves are depleted, the central bank will not be able to 
intervene again in the foreign exchange market and will have to allow the commercial rate to 
depreciate. We assume that the foreign exchange rate market is unified after the abandonment of 
the peg. 
Naturally, investors will try to forecast as best as they can the time and the size of the 
devaluation. To examine the likelihood of a devaluation, we need to describe the behavior of the 
trade account. We assume that the trade account  depends on the real exchange rate:  
                                             ,   = 1 t t t q R R κ − −                                                                   (18) 
The probability of a unique floating exchange rate can be written as: 




t t q R R δ κ χμ μ κ − − ≤ − ≤ + + +                                  (19) 
Equation (19) indicates that a devaluation in a trading partner (a negative 
q μ ) will deteriorate 
the trade account and increase the probability of a currency crisis.  Similarly, expansionary 
domestic monetary policy will trigger higher prices and a real appreciation of the domestic 
currency and a deteriorating trade balance.  In the event of a currency crisis, the exchange rate 
market will be unified with the exchange rate equal to e ~ .  Note that the expected future value of 
the financial exchange rate can be written as 
               0) > | ( 0)] ( Pr [1 ~ 0) ( Pr = 1 1 1 1 1 1 + + + + + + ≤ − + ≤ t t t t t t t t R f E R e R f E                          (20) 
The expected financial exchange rate is a non-linear function of monetary and fiscal 
shocks, investors’ preference for emerging markets, world interest rates, output, and real 
exchange rate shocks.  To aid in the solution, we linearize equation (20).  Instead of evaluating 
separately the path of the financial rate and foreign exchange reserves, we follow the crisis 
literature and estimate an index of severity of the speculative attack by using a composite 
indicator tracking foreign exchange reserve losses and the dual market premium.
16 
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16 In the crisis literature, the index of exchange market pressure is a composite index that incorporates reserve losses 
of the central bank, the rate of exchange rate depreciation, and hikes in interest rates.  See, for example, 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1994) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).  Here, we adapt the index to account 
for the buildup of pressure in the dual exchange rate market.     15 
 
where  R Δ  is the percent change in foreign exchange reserves of the central bank.  In (21), the 
index of exchange-market pressure increases with expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, and 
positive hikes in world interest rates; it decreases with positive shocks to economic activity and  
money demand as well as with higher investors’ interest in emerging markets.  In Section IV, the 
VAR specification that corresponds to the dual markets system is based on equations (6)-(12)  
and (21).  
IV. Explaning the Nature of Currency Crises 
This section applies the models described in Section III to identify the nature of the 
shocks triggering a speculative attack.  First, we describe the estimation methodology.  Second, 
we  discuss the data, and finally we elaborate on the results. 
The VAR 
Our theoretical model implies estimating the following system:  
                               
. = ) (






C X L A AX
μ
μ
                                                                   (22) 
where  X  is the vector of variables  ] ˆ , ), ( , , , , [ r q e d y g c i −
∗ ,  r ˆ is the level of foreign exchange 
reserves as a proportion of domestic credit during the episodes of fixed exchange rates and is a 
composite index of reserve losses and the dual market premium in episodes with capital account 
inconvertibility, and μ  is the vector of the structural shocks,  ] , , , , , , [
d q s y g c μ μ μ μ μ μ μ
∗ .  The 
theoretical framework of Section III provides guidelines for imposing zero restrictions on the 
elements of  A,  () L A  and C. 
) (L A  is a matrix polynomial of order n, where n is the number of lags, and C is a full 
rank matrix. The covariance matrix of the structural innovations is denoted by Σ .  Under the 
assumption of zero correlation across innovations, Σ  is diagonal. The matrices  A and C capture 
the contemporaneous interactions between all the variables in the system. 
We can now obtain the reduced-form VAR representation by multiplying both sides of 
(22) by 
1 − A :  
 . ) ( = 1 t t t X L B X ε + −  (23) 
ε  is the vector of reduced-form innovations,  ] , , , , , , [
d q s y g c ε ε ε ε ε ε ε
∗ . The structural and 
reduced-form innovations are related by the following equation:  16 
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The identification restrictions for both the unified and the dual exchange-rate models, as 
implied by the analysis of the previous section, can be summarized as follows: 
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Note that the parameters γ  are functions of the structural parameters in the system, such 
as the degree of monetization of the fiscal deficit, and these may be changing over time.  For 
example, with fixed exchange rates and capital mobility, central banks lose their ability to 
conduct an independent monetary policy.  This is not the case with a dual exchange rate regime, 
making it necessary to estimate the systems for each exchange rate regime separately.  Even 
within a particular exchange rate regime, parameters may vary.  For example, the hard peg of 
1991, approved by law, certainly introduced more barriers to the conduct of monetary policy 
than the fixed exchange rate regime implemented in the late 1970s.  Again, we need to test 
parameter stability within a given exchange rate system.   
The Data 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of domestic and external indicators from January 1970 to 
December 2001, the month preceding the last crisis.
17 All the indicators are at a monthly 
frequency so we can track closely the onset of domestic and external vulnerabilities. The dates of 
the currency crises are indicated by the vertical lines. The top two panels show the evolution of 
monetary and fiscal factors.  Domestic credit in dollars (including both credit to the public and 
private sector), shown in the left panel, provides a measure of possible inconsistency between the 
fixed exchange rate and monetary shocks.  The central government deficit (annualized as a 
proportion of GDP), shown in the right panel, provides a measure of government debt 
sustainability. While a broader measure of the public sector would have been more appropriate to 
                                                 
17 See the Data Appendix for data sources and definitions. 17 
 
measure the fiscal stance, long high frequency time series on local governments and public 
enterprises are not available.
18    
The middle panels show the effective real exchange rate (a depreciation is shown as an 
increase in the real exchange rate index) and the index of manufacturing production.   The 
bottom left panel shows the behavior of the world real interest rate, captured by the U.S. real 
interest rate.  Finally, the bottom right panel shows the first principal component of foreign 
exchange reserves
19 of the five largest Latin American countries (with the exception of 
Argentina), Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela.  With this index, we try to provide 
a measure of investors’ sentiments towards Latin America.  Investors’ overall enthusiasm about 
Latin American markets translates into increases in the first principal component of foreign 
exchange reserves held by central banks, while worries about Latin America lead to losses of 
foreign exchange reserves across Latin American countries, again as captured by the first 
principal component of reserves.  Since increases in foreign exchange reserves of central banks 
can also be affected by changes in interest rates in financial centers, we will separately identify 
in our estimations the effect of shocks to investors’ preferences (possibly capturing contagion 
effects) and world interest rate shocks on the fluctuations of the first principal component  (as 
shown in equation 9). 
The Results 
As discussed in the chronology, we divided our sample into fixed and dual exchange rate 
regimes.  The fixed exchange rate regimes include the Tablita, Alemann, Austral, and 
Convertibility Plans
20 while the dual exchange rate regimes include the Gelbard, Primavera, and 
BB Plans. 
Macropolicies and credibility may vary across and within stabilization plans, affecting 
the transmission of shocks and making it necessary to test for parameter stability.  Since periods 
with dual exchange rate regimes are very short, we cannot test this hypothesis.  Thus, we 
                                                 
18 Information on public sector debt is available, although not at a monthly frequency. 
19 It would have been preferable to use international capital flows data to emerging markets to proxy  “investors’ 
interest in emerging markets.”  However, capital flow data is at best only available at quarterly or even annual 
frequencies.   
20 While during the Tablita and Convertibility Plans there were never controls on foreign exchange transactions,  at 
times during the Alemann and Austral Plans, the government allowed different rates for financial and commercial 
exchange rate transactions.  Still, we include these last two episodes in our estimations of the fixed exchange rate 
episodes because when these plans were launched, a unique exchange rate regime was implemented.   18 
 
estimate a unique VAR for the Gelbard, Primavera, and BB Plans and the currency crises that 
followed the implementation of those plans.  Since the fixed exchange rate regimes episodes are 
longer-lasting, we test for parameter stability during these episodes.
21 We test for three structural 
breaks.  We examine whether the transmission mechanism during the Tablita-Alemann-Austral 
periods is different from that of the Convertibility Plan.  We also test for two structural breaks 
during the Convertibility Plan: the crisis in April 1995 (following the Mexican crisis) and the 
Brazilian crisis in January 1999.  We find that the transmission mechanism during the Tablita-
Alemann-Austral is different from that of the Convertibility Plan.  We also find a structural break 
in the aftermath of the Brazilian crisis.  Thus, our results for the fixed exchange rate episodes 
will include three VAR systems:  The first includes the Tablita, Alemann and Austral Programs; 
the second one refers to the Convertibility program from its implementation in April 1991 to 
December 1998; while the third episode starts in January 1999 with the Brazilian devaluation 
and ends with the  collapse of the currency board in January 2002. 
As examined above, our VARs include seven variables: the world real interest rate, the 
first principal component of foreign exchange reserves of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, government deficit (as a proportion of GDP), industrial production, domestic credit 
in dollars, the real exchange rate, and foreign reserves ( or the index of exchange market pressure 
for the dual periods).  However, in light of the unavailability of data series on industrial 
production during the Gelbard Plan (1973-1975), the VAR for the dual exchange rate regimes 
only includes six variables.   Although some of our variables turned out to be I(1),
22 we estimate 
an unrestricted VAR in levels in order to allow the data to pick up the underlying long-run 
cointegrating relationship.  We allow for 2 lags in all three systems
23, which was sufficient to 
produce serially uncorrelated residuals.
24   
                                                 
21 To test whether VARs were different, we introduced slope dummies representing various periods into the reserves 
equation, with a significant slope dummy implying that transmission mechanisms were different across different 
periods. 
22 Dickey-Fuller tests failed to reject the unit root hypothesis for the first principal component of foreign exchange 
reserves of the five largest Latin American economies, foreign exchange reserves of the central bank of Argentina,  
the industrial output and money variables at the 5 percent significance level (although we got mixed results on 
money variables, depending on number of lags ultimately chosen).  The hypothesis was rejected for the world real  
interest rate, the exchange market pressure index and the deficit. 
23 The estimation was done with only one lag for the dual system, due to the limited number of observations for the 
hyperinflation episode. We also estimated the system with one lag for the 1999-2001 unified exchange rate system. 
24 Slope dummies were introduced for hyperinflation periods and for periods in which no stabilization plan was 
being implemented. Based on the model's assumptions and significance levels of variables, we formulate the world 19 
 
We present our results in three complementary ways.  First, we examine the impulse 
responses to assess whether we have identified correctly the various shocks, that is, whether, for 
example, our “money supply” shock leads to a decline in foreign exchange reserves of the central 
bank as the first generation model of currency crises described in Section III predicts.  Second, 
we report the variance-decomposition of reserves during the fixed exchange rate regimes and of 
the index of exchange market pressure during dual exchange rate regimes to assess the 
importance of domestic and foreign shocks. The variance decompositions provide us with a 
yardstick of the average role of each shock over the whole estimation period, that is, during both 
tranquil and crisis times.  In some cases, such as during dual exchange rate periods, the variance 
decompositions show the importance of each shock over various stabilization plans and crisis 
episodes.  To untangle the role of domestic and world shocks for each stabilization program and 
on the unfolding of the currency turbulences for each crisis examined, we then present the 
historical decompositions of foreign exchange reserves and the index of market pressure for the 
various stabilization plans and then estimate the role of each shock from the onset of the 
fragilities until the crisis month.  
Figure 3 shows the impulse responses of the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to 
domestic credit (shown in percent) to domestic and external shocks during episodes of unified 
exchange markets. The left panels show the impulse responses during the Tablita, Alemann and 
Austral Plans, the middle panels show the impulse responses for the first part of the 
Convertibility Plan from the implementation of the currency board until the Brazilian Crisis, and 
the right panels show the impulse responses for the second part of the Convertibility Period from 
the Brazilian Crisis to the Argentine Crisis in January 2002.  The top four panels show the 
responses to domestic shocks.  The effects of shocks to money supply, government deficit, and 
money demand are all statistically significant and of the expected signs, with positive shocks to 
money supply and government deficit and negative shocks to money demand triggering losses of 
reserves, with somewhat more persistent effects during the Tablita-Alemann-Austral Plans.   In 
contrast, the effects of shocks to output only show a strong and  positive effect on reserves 
                                                                                                                                                             
real interest rate equation as a univariate AR(1).  The equation for the first principal component of reserves of the 
five largest Latin American countries only includes lags of the world real interest rate in addition to lags of the  
principal component variable itself. Ultimately, we end up estimating a near VAR using SUR estimation while 
allowing for a Sims-Bernanke decomposition of the structural innovations. 20 
 
during the second part of the Convertibility Plan.  The effect of this shock on reserves is 
negligible during the other two episodes as shown in Table 2.   
The bottom three panels show the responses to world shocks.  Shocks to the world real 
interest rate are only statistically significant during the Tablita-Alemann-Austral Plans and the 
first part of the Convertibility Plan (until the Brazilian Crisis), with hikes in world interest rates 
triggering losses in reserves.  Since the 1990s, a continuously increasing research in international 
finance has emphasized the role of international investors’ sentiments (or “risk appetite”) in 
creating capital flow bonanzas to particular regions, such as Latin America in the late 1970s, 
Europe in the early 1990s, or East Asia in the mid 1990s.  This same literature has also singled 
out the role of international investors’ sentiments in capital flow reversals.  As the impulse 
responses in Figure 3 show, those effects, captured by shocks to the first principal component of 
foreign exchange reserves, are only important during the early 1990s up to the Brazilian crisis in 
January 1999.  Finally, shocks to the real exchange rate (attempting to capture exogenous 
shocks, such as trade partners fluctuations in their real exchange rates due to crises or the 
adoption of a stabilization plan) are never statistically significant.   
Figure 4 shows the dynamic responses during Dual Exchange Rate Regimes.  Domestic 
shocks are also important during these episodes, with positive shocks to money supply and fiscal 
deficits and negative shocks to money demand leading to currency turbulences as captured by 
reserve losses or increases in the dual market premium.  While the dual market system 
implemented in Argentina implied the use of controls on capital flows to insulate the domestic 
economy from world shocks, our results indicate that fluctuations in world real interest rates and 
shocks to “investors’ interest in emerging markets” have statistically significant effects on the 
index of exchange market pressure, with hikes in world interest rates and negative shocks to 
investors’ sentiment leading to currency turmoil in Argentina.  As with fixed exchange rate 
regimes, real exchange rate shocks are never statistically significant. 
Tables 2 and 3 report the variance decompositions for the fixed exchange rate and the 
dual exchange rate episodes, respectively.  As Table 2 shows, the shocks that move the currency 
market vary across all these episodes, only money demand shocks are important across the whole 
sample (explaining between 18 and 80 percent of the conditional variance of foreign exchange 
reserves at all horizons), suggesting that changes in rules as well as improvement or 
abandonment of property rights affect dramatically households’ behavior and are at the core of 21 
 
all bonanzas and crises in Argentina.  Interestingly, the period starting in April 1991 with the 
adoption of the currency board until the Brazilian crisis in January 1999 looks different from 
other episodes.  During the earlier part of the currency board episode, world shocks –as captured 
by shocks to world real interest rates and “investors’ interest in emerging markets” – account for 
about 20 to 70 percent of the conditional variance of foreign exchange reserves (as a proportion 
of domestic credit in dollars).  In contrast, vulnerabilities in  domestic indicators –fiscal deficits 
and shocks to economic activity–  are the main drivers of  reserve fluctuations during the last 
part of the Convertibility Plan, accounting for about 60 percent of the variance in foreign 
exchange reserve forecasting errors.  Finally, currency booms and busts during the Tablita, 
Alemann, and Austral Plans are mostly explained by world real interest rate shocks and money 
supply and demand shocks (in line with the crisis chronology).   
Table 3 reports the variance decomposition for the dual exchange rate episodes.  Again, 
as during the fixed exchange rate episodes, money demand shocks explain a substantial part of 
currency market ups and downs (between 20 and 50 percent of the forecasting variance of the 
index of exchange market pressure for all horizons).   The dual exchange rate episodes look very 
similar to the Tablita-Alemann-Austral plans, with money supply shocks and world interest rates 
explaining about 50 percent of the forecasting variance of the index of market pressure.     
To track the effects of the identified domestic and world shocks in real-time on currency 
bonanzas and crises, we now present the historical decompositions of the foreign exchange 
reserves and the index of exchange market pressure.  Figures 5 and 6 present, respectively, the 
decomposition for the fixed exchange rate and the dual exchange rate episodes from the 
implementation of each  stabilization plan until the crisis.  In these figures, the solid line shows 
the difference between the actual value of reserves or index of market pressure and the 
forecasted value with information at the start of the stabilization plan while the dotted lines show 
the part explained by either domestic or international shocks.  Since the Alemann Stabilization 
Plan only lasted a few months and this plan also helped maintain the fixed exchange rate regime 
launched with the Tablita Plan, we report the historical decomposition jointly for both plans.    
The results in Figure 5 indicate that the capital flow bonanza, as captured by the increases 
in reserves, in the year following the implementation of the stabilization plans was mostly fueled 
by better domestic fundamentals across all episodes.  This finding agrees with the conventional 
wisdom in both academic and policy circles that the launching of the stabilization plans 22 
 
coincided, at least transitorily, with fiscal and monetary reforms as well as deregulation of the 
financial sector.
25  Our results for the Tablita Plan and first part of the Convertibility Plan also 
show that the capital flow bonanzas in the year following the implementation of the plans were 
triggered by favorable external conditions.   We feel confident about our identification since the 
implementation of the Tablita in the late 1970s and Convertibility Plans in the beginning of the 
1990s coincided with episodes of low world real interest rates and with a surge in investors’ 
interest in emerging markets following the Brady debt relief program of 1989-90.    The 
historical decompositions in Figure 5 indicate that capital flow reversals and the onset of the 
crises in 1981-82 and 2001 were caused in part (totally for the crisis in 1987) by deteriorating 
domestic fundamentals.  In contrast, the reversal in the path of reserves starting in 1994  was 
mostly due to unfavorable world conditions.  Only during the four months preceeding the 1995  
crisis were fragilities observed on the home front, mostly driven by bank deposit runs.   
Figure 6 shows the historical decompositions for the stabilization plans during the dual 
exchange rate regimes.  In this figure, we jointly examine the two stabilization plans during the 
hyperinflation episode.  In contrast with the stabilization plans during the fixed exchange rate 
regimes, the implementation of the Gelbard, Primavera, and BB Plans do not fuel (even 
transitorily) a reduction in exchange market pressures.  In the Gelbard Plan, a large part of the 
initial vulnerabilities are triggered by adverse external conditions, driven by hikes in world 
interest rates in 1974.  In the stabilization plans in the late 1980s, the exchange market pressure 
is mostly explained by rapidly deteriorating monetary conditions.  Remember that these plans 
take place at the height of the hyperinflation period, which only ends with the implementation of 
the Convertibility Plan.  
Figures 5 and 6 only assess the combined effect of all domestic shocks or that of external 
shocks.  Also, the historical decompositions in these figures cover times of both bonanza and 
crisis.  Table 4 provides a higher resolution picture of crisis times.  First, it untangles the various 
sources of domestic fragility into money supply, government deficit, output, and money demand 
shocks. Second, it sorts out the origins of external vulnerability into world real interest, 
investors’ interest in emerging markets (or contagion), and real exchange rate shocks.  Third,  it 
concentrates on the onset of the currency turmoil until the crisis, that is, it shows the historical 
                                                 
25 See, for example, IMF (2004a, 2004b), Blejer and Liviatan (1987), Kiguel (1989), and Machinea and Fanelli 
(1987). 23 
 
decompositions from the times reserves start to fall or the index of market pressure starts to 
increase.  Each cell in this table shows the share of the fluctuations in foreign exchange reserves 
(or the index of exchange market pressure) explained by each single shock.  As shown in Table 
4, all currency crises are preceded by domestic vulnerabilities with the exception of the 1995 
crisis.  Monetary shocks are at the core of the domestic fragilities for all crises with the exception 
of the 2002 crisis, when dramatic adverse shocks to economic activity seal the fate of the 
currency board.  Importantly, monetary shocks do not just reflect money supply shocks.  In 
particular, money demand shocks are very important during the Tablita, Alemann, and Austral 
crises.  As described in our chronology, these are episodes plagued by numerous regulatory 
changes on interest rates and foreign exchange markets –as during the period from February 
1981 to June 1982– or by the stop and go cycles of controls on prices, wages and public utilities 
during the Austral Plan.
26  Naturally, these continuous changes in rules on financial and price 
contracts fuel uncertainty and reduce households’ faith in the financial system and overall ability 
of the authorities to maintain the peg.  Finally, our results do not uncover an important fiscal 
effect at the onset of the crises.  These results may be due to our “fiscal deficit” indicator that 
includes the central government but not the local governments and public enterprises, which ran 
particularly large deficits during the Tablita Plan and the latter part of the Convertibility Plan.   
Since our fiscal indicator captures only partially the fiscal deficit of the consolidated public 
sector, fiscal shocks may in fact be captured by the shocks to money supply in equation (6).
27   
External shocks are also important in explaining currency turbulences.  For example, 
hikes in world interest rates have a major impact on currency vulnerabilities during the Tablita 
and Alemann Plans, when world real interest rates increased from -1 percent in July 1980 to 
                                                 
26 The management of prices was a central part of the Austral Plan.  Prices and wage controls were introduced at the 
start of the program, but the first adjustment in prices was implemented in April 1986.  In July 1986, the government 
introduced ceilings for monthly increases in prices as well as limits on wage increases.  By the last months of 1986, 
prices were again fluctuating freely.  In February 1987, a price freeze was again announced only to be relaxed in 
May 1987. 
27 Since the results in Table 2 show that even our partial measure of fiscal shocks can explain 20 percent of the 
variance decomposition for foreign exchange reserves during the last part of the Convertibility Plan (January 1999- 
December 2001), we examine the possibility of a time-varying effect of the fiscal shock.    We decompose the 
historical decomposition in Table 4 into two episodes.  The first episode starts in January 2001 from the onset of 
currency turmoil and lasts until July 2001.  The second episode starts in August 2001 and ends in December 2001, 
with the collapse of the Convertibility Plan.  During the first episode, increases in government deficit explain 18 
percent of the losses of reserves.  But on July 29, 2001, the Argentine Congress passes the “Zero Deficit Law,” 
requiring a balanced budget by the fourth quarter of 2001.  In August 2001, the deficit starts to decline while 
reserves losses continue to increase, explaining the almost zero cumulative net effect of fiscal shocks on reserves 
from January to December 2001 shown in Table 4.       24 
 
about 10 percent on average in 1981-1982, and during the Convertibility Plan in 1994, when the 
Federal Reserve increased its policy rate by  250 basis points.  Indeed, our results indicate that 53 
percent of the total decline in the historical forecast error of Argentina's reserves between 
October 1979 and June 1982 is explained by world interest rate shocks, with the world interest 
rate effect increasing to 69 percent in the 1995 crisis.    
In the 1990s, external shocks are not limited to those fueled by changes in monetary 
conditions in industrialized countries.  Spillover effects from other Latin American countries (as 
captured by a shock to investors’ interest in emerging markets) magnify reserve losses triggered 
by monetary tightening in financial centers.  Our empirical estimations suggest that about one-
fourth of the fall in reserves from December 1993 to February 1995 can be explained by 
contagion factors.  However, contrary to theories advocating sudden stops as an explanation of 
the 2002 Argentine crisis (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2002),  we find that adverse shocks to  
investors’ interest in emerging markets played no role in explaining the collapse of the currency 
board as capital inflows had already dried up following the Russian crisis in late 1998.  By 2001, 
investors had already started observing Argentina as a country with problems of its own. 
We also examined the costs of crises fueled by domestic fragilities and those triggered by 
adverse external shocks even in the presence of immaculate domestic fundamentals.  Table 5 
shows various costs for these two types of crises.   First, we looked at the severity of the crises as 
captured by reserve losses in the six months prior to the crises and the real exchange rate 
depreciation in the six months following the crises.  On average, losses of reserves for crises 
fueled by domestic vulnerabilities reach 33 percent but only reach 16 percent for crises triggered 
by external shocks.  Similarly, real depreciations are far larger (73 percent) for crises triggered 
by fragile domestic fundamentals than for crises with only adverse external shocks (5 percent).  
Second, we examined the crisis impact on the economy.  Output losses in the year of the crisis 
and the following year average 5 percent for crises with domestic fragilities while the economy 
grows 3 percent during the crisis triggered by adverse external shocks.  Finally, we examined the 
external adjustment following the crises.  Access to international capital markets can be severely 
impaired in the aftermath of crises, with countries having to run sizable current account surpluses 
to repay their debt.  We examined the size and type of the adjustment across these two types of 
crises.  In the case of crises with domestic vulnerabilities, most of the adjustment occurs on the 
import side, with imports falling approximately 23 percent in the year following the crisis and 25 
 
exports only growing 21 percent despite large depreciations during this type of crisis.  This 
evidence suggests that Argentina might have been unable to attract trade credits to finance 
exports when its economy was quite fragile.  In contrast, in the aftermath of the 1995 crisis, 
booming exports were at the heart of the recovery of the current account (35 percent increase) 
and even imports continued to increase (10 percent).   
V. Conclusions    
 Economists have puzzled at length over the causes and severity of currency crises.  As a 
result, research in this area has surged, especially since the ERM crises in 1992-1993.  Most of 
the empirical research has focused on predicting crises using reduced-form estimations and failed 
to uncover the effect of policy and structural shocks on the changing severity of currency 
turmoil.  This paper uses an old methodology to study this new problem, implementing VAR 
techniques to quantify the role of different shocks in the severity of currency crises.  Our case 
study is Argentina, a country that not only has been at the center stage in every single episode of 
international financial turmoil (such as the 1982 debt crisis, the 1994 Tequila crisis, and the 1999 
Brazilian crisis), but also has had many currency collapses of its own.  Thus, while our analysis 
is confined to one country, it does provide a glimpse of the nature of worldwide currency 
turbulences.  Our results confirm previous findings in the literature but also suggest new results.   
The major conclusions that emerge from our analysis are as follows. First, our 
estimations confirm the results obtained by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1992) regarding the 
role of monetary tightening in industrial countries during the episodes of capital flows reversals 
of the early 1980s and mid 1990s.  Both the collapse of the Tablita-Alemann Plans and the 
speculative attack against the peso in 1994-95 in the midst of the Convertibility Plan were in 
large part precipitated by the shift to a contractionary monetary stance in the United States. 
Second, as expected, inconsistent monetary and exchange rate policies did trigger many 
of the main speculative attacks against the peso.  But, as our event chronology and historical 
decompositions suggest, loose monetary policy was not the only culprit.  The erratic nature of 
capital account restrictions and interest rate and credit controls as well as the stop and go cycles 
on price and wage controls in the mid 1980s also played a key role— with the uncertainty 
triggered by forced conversion of contracts leading to capital flight and downward pressure on 
money demand.   26 
 
Third, the mid-1990s look somewhat different.  Spillovers from Mexico and other Latin 
American countries seem to have been a source of financial distress for Argentina, explaining 
about  25 percent of the severity of the speculative attack in 1995.  This is not surprising as in the 
1990s the extent of integration of Latin America to international capital markets sharply 
increases.  It is also in the 1990s when mutual funds become important players in Latin America.  
Naturally, this provides a new channel for spillovers, as was the case when mutual funds 
retreated from several countries in Latin America after the losses they suffered from the Mexican 
devaluation.   
Fourth, the origin of the 2002 crisis lies in the sharp depression that started in the last half 
of 1998 and continued and deepened throughout the pre-crisis period. As the economy slided 
into recession, the currency board became a liability as the government was constrained to carry 
out a contractionnary monetary policy in the midst of a a profound recession.  Financial 
contagion from Brazil or other Latin American countries was found to play no role in explaining 
the collapse of the currency board in 2001.   
Finally, our results show that the participation in international capital markets can be 
risky and that crises may occur even in the presence of immaculate domestic fundamentals.  Still, 
the costs of crises triggered by just adverse external shocks are far smaller than those of crises 
fueled by fragile domestic fundamentals. 27 
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All data is from International Financial Statistics, IMF unless explained below. 
 
Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas, FIEL 
 
Definitions and Units of the Variables in Figures 1 and 2: 
 
r: Ratio of Argentina’s Foreign Exchange Reserves to Domestic Credit  in dollars, in percent. 
 
(f-e): Percentage difference between the black/dual exchange market exchange rate and the 
commercial exchange rate. 
 
d-e: Total domestic credit of the banking sector, measured in billion dollars at the commercial 
exchange rate. 
 
q:  Real effective exchange rate with respect to Argentina’s main trading partners.  
 
i*: U.S. Real Interest Rate: Nominal interest rate on one-year U.S. Treasury Bills adjusted for 
CPI inflation (in percent). 
 
c: First principal component of foreign exchange reserves of the following countries: Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.  The principal component is constructed as a linear 
combination of the five series, where the weights correspond to the eigenvector associated with 
the largest eigenvalue of the covariance matrix of the individual series (See Drhymes (1974) for 
an explanation of principal components analysis). 
 
g: Annualized central goverment deficit measured as a proportion of GDP, in percent. Obtained 
from Ministry of Finance, the IMF Government Finance Statistics and IMF Staff reports. 
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 Name Implemented on:
Gelbard May 1973 March, 1975 56 369 100 628
Tablita December 1978 February 1981 45 n.a 10 136
Alemann December 1981 July 1982 17 n.a 148 244
Austral June 1985 September 1987 75 n.a. 16 133
Primavera August 1988 April 1989 62 206 387 4025
BB July 1989 February 1990 58 105 220 232
Convertibility April 1991 March 1995 41 n.a 0 0
Convertibility April 1991 January 2002 50 n.a 40 265
Note:  * For each episode, reserve losses are computed from the month the stock of reserves held by the central bank peaks until the crisis date.
Table 1
Stabilization Plans and Crises
Stabilization Plans 
Crisis Date
Reserve Losses     
(in percent)*
Dual Market 
Premium on the 
Month of the Crisis 
(in percent)
Devaluation on the 
Month of the Crisis 
(in percent)
Cumulative 
Devaluation        
in the First Six 
Months Following 














































1 1 9 10 8 0 000680 8 1 0400 1 0 1 5 7 1 300
2 1 7 20 8 0 100470 7 7 3912 1 7 3 3 4 4 111
3 1 6 32 7 6 200460 6 9 7 1 3 13 1 9 4 0 3 3 122
4 1 6 35 7 0 500450 6 1 1 1 1 7 14 2 0 4 3 2 8 122
5 1 7 37 6 5 800550 5 5 1 4 2 0 14 2 0 4 5 2 5 132
6 1 7 39 5 9 1 1 00540 5 0 1 7 2 2 15 2 0 4 5 2 3 133
7 1 7 3 1 0 5 5 1 5 00540 4 6 1 9 2 5 15 2 1 4 6 2 2 143
8 1 8 3 1 0 5 0 1 8 00540 4 3 2 1 2 6 15 2 1 4 6 2 1 143
9 1 8 3 1 1 4 6 2 1 00530 4 0 2 3 2 8 15 2 1 4 6 2 1 143
1 0 1 8 3 1 1 4 3 2 4 00530 3 8 2 4 2 9 15 2 1 4 6 2 0 143
1 1 1 9 3 1 1 4 0 2 7 00530 3 6 2 5 3 1 15 2 1 4 6 2 0 243
1 2 1 9 3 1 1 3 8 2 9 00530 3 4 2 5 3 2 15 2 1 4 5 2 0 243
1 3 2 0 3 1 0 3 6 3 1 00530 3 3 2 6 3 3 15 2 0 4 5 2 0 243
1 4 2 0 3 1 0 3 4 3 3 00530 3 1 2 6 3 4 15 2 0 4 5 1 9 343
1 5 2 1 3 1 0 3 2 3 4 00530 3 0 2 7 3 5 15 2 0 4 5 1 9 343
1 6 2 1 2 1 0 3 1 3 5 00520 2 9 2 7 3 6 15 2 0 4 5 1 9 443
1 7 2 1 29 3 0 3 6 00520 2 8 2 7 3 6 15 2 0 4 4 1 9 443
1 8 2 2 29 2 9 3 7 00520 2 7 2 7 3 7 15 2 0 4 4 1 9 543
1 9 2 2 29 2 8 3 8 00520 2 7 2 8 3 8 15 2 0 4 4 1 9 643
2 0 2 3 29 2 7 3 8 00520 2 6 2 8 3 9 15 2 0 4 4 1 9 643
2 1 2 3 29 2 7 3 8 10520 2 5 2 8 3 9 15 2 0 4 3 1 8 743
2 2 2 4 28 2 6 3 9 10520 2 5 2 8 4 0 15 1 9 4 3 1 8 743
2 3 2 4 28 2 6 3 9 10520 2 4 2 8 4 0 15 1 9 4 3 1 8 843




Fraction of Variance Due to Shocks to:
Tablita, Alemann, and Austral Plans
Variance Decomposition for Foreign Exchange Reserves During Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes















1 5 1 0 4 7 100
2 4 8 3 4 7 110
3 4 4 7 4 5 221
4 4 01 04 2 4 2 2
5 3 71 24 0 7 3 3
6 3 51 33 7 9 3 4
7 3 31 33 51 1 3 4
8 3 21 33 41 4 4 5
9 3 11 23 21 6 4 5
10 30 12 31 18 4 5
11 29 11 30 19 4 5
12 29 11 29 21 5 5
13 28 11 29 22 5 5
14 28 11 28 24 5 5
15 27 11 27 25 5 5
16 27 11 27 26 5 5
17 26 11 26 27 5 5
18 26 11 26 27 5 5
19 25 11 25 28 5 5
20 25 11 25 29 5 4
21 25 11 25 29 6 4
22 24 12 24 30 6 4
23 24 12 24 30 6 4
24 24 12 24 31 6 4
During Dual Market Regimes
Horizon 
(months)
Fraction of Variance Due to Shocks to:
Note:  * It captures responses to exogenous shocks to the real exchange rate, such as nominal devaluations 
in trading-partner countries.
Table 3


















March 1975 41 34 -3 9 59 36 7… 16
February 1981 and July 1982 42 53 -9 -2 58 18 2 -3 40
September 1987 0 -14 6 8 100 23 -14 14 77
August 1988 and July 1989 41 17 12 12 59 72 2… -16
March 1995 93 69 24 -1 7 -1 -3 -4 15
January 2002 11 22 -20 8 91 13 -7 63 22
Table 4
Crisis
Note: This table focuses on explaining the onset of crises.  The historical decomposition starts from the month when foreign exchange reserves are at their peak or when the 
dual market premium is at its through and ends on the month of the crisis.   Numbers in bold signify that impulse responses for these shocks are significant for most horizons.
Losses of Reserves or Increases in the Dual Market Premium: Percentage Share Explained by:
External Shocks Domestic Shocks
The Role of Domestic and External Shocks on the Onset of CrisesCrisis
Reserve losses 












the Year of 













March 1975 40 181 -5 20 -46
February 1981 56 53 -5 30 -50
July 1982 10 30 -8 19 -6
September 1987 36 27 1 34 -4
August 1988 47 66 -8 35 -39
July 1989 20 -20 9 6 4
March 1995 16 5 3 35 10
January 2002 25 174 -15 4 -16
Crises with Domestic Vulnerabilities 33 73 -5 21 -23
Crises with External Adverse Shocks 16 5 3 35 10
Table 5
Costs of Crises
Notes: Reserves, exports, and imports are in U.S. dollars.  Output is measured as real GDP.  The last two rows of the Table 
show the average costs of currency crises mainly triggered by domestic vulnerabilities and currency crises mainly fueled by 
adverse external shocks.  As discussed in the paper, the only crisis triggered by external adverse shocks is the March 1995 
crisis.
(in percent)Foreign Exchange Reserves
(in Billion Dollars)
Dual Exchange Market Premium
(in Percent)
Figure 1


























































































































































































































Real Exchange Rate Industrial Production






















































































































































































Note: The vertical lines indicate the month of the crises.
(Percent per Annum) Index Number





































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Impulse  Responses of Foreign Exchange Reserves to Various Shocks during Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes
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Money Demand   Convertibility Plan: April 1991-December 1998
Figure 5
Sources of the Fluctuations in Foreign Exchange Reserves
During Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes
  Tablita and Alemann Plans



































Note:  In each panel, the solid line shows the difference between the level of reserves (as a share of domestic credit in dollars--in percent) and the level that 
would have been forecasted based upon the history of the system up through the implementation of the stabilization plan.  Thus, it reflects the cumulative 
impact of both domestic and foreign shocks.  The dotted line shows the actual path of reserves that would have prevailed if either domestic or foreign 
shocks had hit the system.























































Jan-99 Jul-99 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01
External Note:  In each panel, the solid line shows the difference between the level of the index of exchange market pressure (in percent) and the level that would have been forecasted based 
upon the history of the system up through the implementation of the stabilization plan.  Thus, it reflects the cumulative impact of both domestic and foreign shocks.  The dotted line 
shows the actual path of the index of exchange market pressure that would have prevailed if either domestic or foreign shocks had hit the system.
Gelbard Plan
 Sources of Fluctuations in the Index of Market Pressure During Dual Exchange Rate Regimes
Figure 6
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External